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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
LECTURE SERIES*
THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
Archibald Cox**
Scarcely any political question arises in the United
States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judi-
cial question.1
Count de Tocqueville's observation is as true today as it was when
he visited the United States in the 1830's. As nowhere else in the
world, Americans have developed the extraordinary habit of casting
critical aspects of social, economic, political and even philosophical
questions into the form of actions at law and suits in equity so that the
courts-and ultimately the Supreme Court of the United States-may
participate in their disposition.
The substantive constitutional issues of each period reflect its cen-
tral political questions. John Marshall's Court helped forge a Nation
out of jealous States. Chief Justice Taney dealt all too unsuccessfully
with the question of slavery in the territories. From the Civil War
through World War II the great debate lay between the defenders of
economic laissez faire and the advocates of the use of government as
an instrument of the economic regulation, welfare measures, and so-
cial reform required for an urban, industrialized society. Recently, the
dominant issues have arisen from the civil rights revolution, the de-
mands for electoral reform, and the collision between subjectivism
* The Washington Law Review Lecture Series, now in its third year, is designed
to bring outstanding speakers to the law school to discuss contemporary legal issues.
The Review gratefully acknowledges the generous financial assistance provided by the
Evans Bunker Memorial Fund.
** Williston Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; A.B., 1934, Harvard Uni-
versity; LL.B., 1937, Harvard University; LL.D., 1975, Harvard University.
1. 1 A. DE TOcQUEVILLE, DEMocRACY IN AMERICA 280 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
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and laws ordained by an older morality. Those who have lost the
battle in the political arena have always carried the war to the courts.
The new dimensions to which my title refers are of a different
order; they are not substantive but institutional. That the Supreme
Court has always played a partly political role-that it has always
made a certain amount of public policy in some areas under the guise
of interpreting the Constitution-is all too obvious. That it has
usually felt partly bound by "law" is equally obvious to anyone who
understands the self-discipline of the legal method. The question of
emphasis always remains. How large or small is-or should be-the
political element in judicial decisions?
There also remains a second question. How much and what parts of
the business of government should the judicial branch oversee, even to
the point of conducting it? More particularly, what kinds of interests
will move a court to intervene? Who may join in the action? What
kinds of questions will the court decide? What kinds of remedies will
it make available?
The past quarter century seems to me to have brought dramatic
changes not only in the weight of the political components of constitu-
tional decisions but also in the nature, character, and extent of the
judiciary's share of the overall business of government. Taken all to-
gether these changes give constitutional adjudication the new dimen-
sions to which my title refers.
The primary aim of this article is to describe the changes. Their
true significance lies in their cumulative effect upon the nature of the
judicial process and the effectiveness of judge-made constitutional
law. Towards the end, I shall pose a number of questions about the
cumulative effect of the changes upon the nature of the judicial pro-
cess and support for constitutionalism.
I. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Under Chief Justices Fuller, White and Taft, a majority of the Jus-
tices were usually ready to write their own political and economic phi-
losophies into the generalities of the "due process" and "equal protec-
tion" clauses. 2 The volume of nay-saying decisions increased during
2. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adair v. United States. 208
U.S. 161 (1908); Adkins v. Children's Hosp.. 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
792
Vol. 51: 791, 1976
Constitutional Adjudication
the mid-1930's in the face of a rising political demand for state and
national action to halt the Great Depression and adjust the imbalances
created by corporate and financial power. 3 The strongest legal and
intellectual attacks upon the decisions asserted that the conservative
Justices misconceived the Court's proper function when they allowed
themselves to read any particular political or economic philosophy
into the Constitution, and that they also misapprehended the proper
relation between the Court and the political branches in failing to
defer to legislative findings of fact and policy preferences. Progressive
historians were proving that judicial review was a usurpation of
power. Political scientists emphasized its anti-majoritarian, undemo-
cratic tradition. In 1937, in the face of President Roosevelt's court-
packing plan, the Justices retreated, 4 and a philosophy of deference
rapidly became the dominant view among the Justices and lower court
judges, as well as in the law schools and legal profession.
Three components of the philosophy of judicial self-restraint de-
serve identification even though their statement oversimplifies the judi-
cial process and no Justice adhered to any, much less all, of them ab-
solutely:
(1) A judge should be slow to read-or should not read-into the
majestic constitutional phrases "the freedom of speech," "due process
of law" and "equal protection of the laws" more particular values
based upon what some would call "natural law, .... fundamental
rights," or "the teaching of an inherited constitutional tradition," but
which others brand "mere arbitrary personal preferences." 5
(2) The judge should be slow to substitute-or should not substitute
-his will for the legislature's in choosing between opposing values
such as economic liberty and the protection of the wage earners. 6
(3) A judge may not examine the facts underlying a constitutional
question too meticulously. He should accept the legislative finding if it
could be correct, and presume the existence of any state of facts that
3. E.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936).
4. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5. The best examples of the rigid version of this philosophy---must not read"-
are the opinions of Justices Black and Stewart in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 507, 527 (1965).
6. E.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). See also Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943).
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would validate the statute if the existence of such facts is rationally
conceivable. 7
This philosophy, of which Thayer, Holmes, Frankfurter and
Learned Hand were the most eloquent spokesmen, plainly assigns a
very modest role to constitutional adjudication. In dissenting from its
assertion half a century earlier, Justice Field had given a fair descrip-
tion of the logical consequences: 8
If the courts could not in such cases examine into the real character of
the act, but must accept the declaration of the legislature as conclu-
sive, the most valued rights of the citizen would be subject to the arbi-
trary control of a temporary majority of such bodies, instead of being
protected by the guarantees of the Constitution.
To exclude the Court from effective review of laws regulating prop-
erty or economic behavior seemed eminently wise to nearly all the
Justices and to most of the legal profession after 1937, but a number
began to have second thoughts about such sweeping denigration of
judicial review in the 1940's when civil liberties litigation began to
crowd the docket. On the one hand, the recollection of past mistakes
and the need for consistency of institutional theory cautioned against
activist judicial ventures even in so deserving an area as civil liberty.
On the other hand, self-restraint would leave much civil liberty at the
mercy of executive or legislative oppression. The only logical escape
from the dilemma was to elevate civil liberties to a "preferred posi-
tion" justifying stricter standards of judicial review than those used in
judging economic measures. The earlier free speech opinions by Jus-
tices Holmes and Brandeis +pointed the way even though they had
been dissenting opinions,9 but the rationale was not fully developed
without intense struggle.
The issue was first drawn sharply in the flag salute cases. 10 The sub-
7. E.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144. 152-53 (1938);
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580. 584 (1935); O'Gorman &
Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 258 (1931); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co.. 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); McLean v. Arkansas. 211 U.S. 539.
550-51 (1909).
8. Powell v. Pennsylvania. 127 U.S. 678. 696-97 (1888).
9. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47. 52 (1919) (Holmes. J.); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652. 672-73 (1925) (Holmes. J.. dissenting); Whitney v. Cali-
fornia. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis. J.. concurring).
10. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
794
Vol. 51: 791, 1976
Constitutional Adjudication
stantive question was whether a state could expel from school, and
treat as truants, the children of Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to
salute the United States flag. Justice Frankfurter invoked the then
conventional rationale of judicial self-restraint. National unity and
respect for national tradition, he reasoned, ate permissible goals of
legislative action. The compulsory flag salute could not be said to be
an irrational means of seeking to secure loyalty to those traditional
ideals, even though the Court might be convinced that deeper patri-
otism would be engendered by refraining from coercing a symbolic
gesture. To reject the legislative conclusion "would amount to no less
than the pronouncement of pedagogical and psychological dogma in a
field where courts possess no marked and certainly no controlling
competence.""
Justice Frankfurter's view did not prevail. In Board of Education v.
Barnette12 Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court, rejected Justice
Frankfurter's plea for consistency in the philosophy of judicial self-
restraint. "We cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence
in such specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that
history authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty is in-
fringed."'1 3 The Court decided that the compulsory flag salute law vio-
lated the liberty guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments.
Dispute continued, but ultimately the "preferred rights" thesis pre-
vailed. Where a regulation of business can be successfully attacked
only if it can be thought to bear no rational relation to any intelligible
conception of the.general welfare, 14 usually a law curtailing opportu-
nities for freedom of speech or association, or other personal liberties
will be sustained only if the government can prove that the limitation
is necessary to protect some compelling public interest not to be se-
cured by less restrictive means. 15 In the latter instances the Court
11. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586. 597-98 (1940), overruled by
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
12. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
13. Id. at 640. Some of the summary statements in the text are, while essentially
true, too simple and too sharp for literal accuracy. Similarly, no Justice embraced or
followed a clear-cut philosophy of judicial review both in absolute terms and con-
sistently. Justice Jackson, for example, was, or became, an advocate of judicial self-
restraint in many civil liberties cases.
14. E.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
15. E.g., Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers Union, 413 U.S. 548 (1973);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960). If the abridgement of speech is censorship or suppression, or even direct
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rarely deferred to the judgment of the policy-making branches upon
the wisdom or need of a measure or even upon underlying questions
of fact.16 Nor was the Court reluctant to create rights under the first,
fifth and fourteenth amendments that are hardly related to the words:
a freedom of association for other than political purposes,' 7 the right
to travel abroad,' 8 freedom to practice birth control,' 9 and the right
to have an abortion 20 are dramatic examples. Similarly, the majority
used the equal protection clause repeatedly "to write into the Consti-
tution its notions of what it thinks is good governmental policy," 2' by
setting aside certain kinds of legislative classifications which will be
held unconstitutional unless justified by a compelling state interest. 22
This familiar history is recalled for two reasons. First, it serves as a
reminder that in reading policy-oriented notions of fundamental rights
into broad constitutional phrases whose proper application cannot be
derived from the words, the Warren Court's view of constitutional
adjudication resembled the method of the older Courts of Fuller,
White and Taft-an approach, indeed, that reflects the dominant judi-
cial mood through most of our history. Second and more important,
the necessity of justifying new standards of strict judicial review for
civil liberties, and later civil rights, cases in the face of the accepted
canons of judicial self-restraint generated judicial philosophy that
encouraged novel forms of constitutional adjudication.
One theoretical justification is summarized in the famous fourth
footnote to the Carolene Products23 case, where Justice Stone invoked
a theory of representative government in order to justify strict consti-
tutional scrutiny of some legislation. 24
regulation. the test is more stringent. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States.
403 U.S. 713 (1971); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
16. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976); United States v. Robel. 389 U.S. 258
(1967); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n. 389 U.S. 217 (1967). But
see Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.. 367 U.S. I. 94-95 (1961).
17. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n. 389 U.S. 217 (1967); United
Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich.. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk. 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State.
378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405
U.S. 438 (1972).
20. Roev. Wade. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
21. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections. 383 U.S. 663. 676 (1966) (Black. J..
dissenting).
22. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.. 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Hunter v.
Erickson. 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana. 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Reynolds v.
Sims. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
23. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
24. Id. at 152 n.4.
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It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more ex-
acting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
He went on to list examples: restrictions upon the right to vote, re-
straints upon the dissemination of information, interference with polit-
ical organization, and the prohibition of political assembly.
Justice Stone's philosophy explains some decisions but not others.
The malapportionment of state legislatures so distorted the political
process as to prevent political correction of the evil.25 Restrictions
upon speech or association may diminish the usefulness of political
remedies.26 The first amendment applies with the same force, how-
ever, to literature, entertainment and the arts.27 Restrictions in the
latter areas have scant relation to the openness of the political process.
Justice Stone's philosophy also fails to justify strict review in cases
involving religious freedom28 and other non-political, personal liber-
ties.29
The Carolene Products footnote also suggested that the Court
should perhaps be especially sensitive to the claims of those whose
color, religion, or esoteric views deprive them of political influence
equal to their numbers. The argument that the Court's function is to
protect minorities cannot be carried very far, however, because rich
bankers whose power a legislature is asked to shear are no less a mi-
nority than blacks or Jehovah's Witnesses. Justice Stone might reply
that when he spoke of "insular minorities," he referred to the groups
that some political scientists call "permanent minorities," because
even in a pluralistic society they have often been unable to form the
alliances necessary to make them part of the majority part of the time.
But even if one accepts the dubious factual premise, the cases go be-
yond the rationale.30
A second, very common theory argues that "personal liberties" de-
serve more stringent protection than "property rights" because society
25. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
26. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
27. "Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
28. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
30. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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should assign them greater value. The rationale merely asserts the
conclusion. As Justice Stewart has observed, no one has yet explained
why holding property is not a personal right. 31
A third justification for strict review of cases involving preferred
rights was advanced by Justice Jackson in the second flag salute
case:
32
The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment,
because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more
definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of
the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific
prohibitions of the First become its standard.
The first amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances.
The fourteenth amendment reads:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
The difference in specificity is considerable, but its relevance is less
obvious. Justice Black stood almost alone in the supposition that the
language of the first amendment could be read literally. The outright
suppression of particular ideas is relatively infrequent. More often, the
restriction pertains to time or place or medium of expression,33 or to
an obstacle erected to the gathering or dissemination of information34
or to a cost attached to it.35 In such cases the public purpose served by
the constraint must be weighed against the cost in freedom of expres-
sion, and the balance depends upon a view of the facts. One must ask,
for example, how real the fears of the press are that sources of infor-
mation will dry up if the courts continue to treat reporters like other
citizens with information needed in the administration of justice and,
31. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.. 405 U.S. 538. 543-52 (1972).
32. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. 639 (1943).
33. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Brandenburg v.
Ohio. 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Adderley v. Florida. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
34. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes. 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper. 336
U.S. 77 (1949).
35. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo. 418 U.S. 241 (1974): New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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if some information dries up, whether the losses are justified by the
gains of having the testimony.3 6 The specificity of the first amendment
does not explain why the Justices should resolve these factual issues
while deferring when property is at stake.
Nor are the guarantees of the first amendment self-defining. Just as
former Justices read concepts like "freedom of contract" and the
"right to pursue a lawful occupation" into the fourteenth amendment,
so the Warren Court interpolated into the first amendment freedom of
association3 7 and other qualified rights hardly related to the words.38
The justification of "specificity" fails entirely when the preferred rights
justification for active review is extended under the equal protection
clause to allegedly "invidious" classifications3 9 or to discrimination in
respect to "fundamental rights,"40 or under the due process clause to
the creation of new personal rights such as to travel,41 to practice
birth control, 42 or to have an abortion.43
It may be said that the very presence of the Bill of Rights in the
Constitution implies that the Framers intended to provide for judicial-
ly-enforced restrictions upon legislative power over certain areas of
human activity which were thought essential to protect against legisla-
tive and executive oppression. Historical support can be adduced for
the argument. During the debate in Congress upon the proposed bills
of rights, for example, James Madison observed: 44
If they [the Amendments] are incorporated into the Constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardian of those rights; they will be an impenetrable
bulwark against every assumption of power 'in the Legislative or the
Executive ....
But the argument from the adoption of a Bill of Rights and the pro-
nouncements of its Framers hardly suggests the limits of preferred
rights and strict review. The guarantee against deprivation of property
36. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
38. See notes 17-20 supra.
39. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
40. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
41. See note 18 supra.
42. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113 (1973).
44. I ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1789) [1789-1824].
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without due process of law is as much a part of the fifth amendment
as the assurance of liberty.
All the theories had two things in common: (1) they justified ac-
tivism and (2) they assigned the Court special responsibilities and even
-one might argue-particular constituencies. At bottom the theories
assert that the ultimate protection for minorities, for spiritual liberty,
and for freedom of expression, political activity and other personal
liberties comes rightfully from the judiciary. In this realm-it was said
-the political process, filled with arbitrary compromises and respon-
sive, as in some degree it must be, to short-run pressures, is inadequate
to enforce the long-range enduring values that often bespeak our aspi-
rations instead of merely reflecting our practices. The Warren Court
thus came to be influenced by an extremely self-conscious sense of
judicial responsibility for the open and egalitarian operation of the
political system, for minorities, for the oppressed, and for a variety of
"rights" not adequately protected by the political process.
At the same time that the Court's sense of responsibility for those
values was growing, losers in the political process were becoming
more conscious of the potentials of constitutional adjudication for
achieving their goals and better equipped to use this weapon. Consti-
tutional litigation came to be conducted more and more by civil rights
and civil liberties organizations, by radical political associations, and
later by law offices funded to stimulate community action and provide
legal services to the poor.
In the 1930's a modest view of the judicial function in constitu-
tional interpretation fitted the desire for progressive social and eco-
nomic reform. The legislative and executive branches were then
engaged in the redistribution of power and the protection of the dis-
advantaged and distressed. By the 1950's because of the cold war,
increased crime, fear of social disorder, and perhaps entrenched eco-
nomic and political power, the legislative process had become re-
sistant to libertarian, humanitarian and egalitarian impulse. In other
circles, a wave of egalitarianism flowed from the rise of the peoples of
Asia and Africa. The multiplication and magnification of government
activities increased sensitivity to threats to civil liberty. Humanitari-
anism, aided by the prevailing teaching of the psychological and so-
cial sciences, cast doubt upon the sterner aspects of the criminal law.
Later, a wave of subjectivism bred wide dissatisfaction with all con-
straints upon freedom to do one's own thing. The Supreme Court then
800
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came to be the branch of government where these impulses beat the
strongest, perhaps by the chance which puts one man rather than an-
other upon the Court, perhaps because the Justices live in the intellec-
tual ratherthan the political world.
In this context, the preferred rights rationale for strict judicial re-
view could hardly fail to stimulate vigorous expansion of the functions
of constitutional adjudication. The result was a period of extraordi-
nary creativity in constitutional law. Brown v. Board of Education45-
-the first school desegregation case-lighted a beacon of hope for
minority victims of racial prejudice. Decisions followed establishing
the "one man, one vote" rule for legislative apportionment46 and
sweeping away the poll tax47 and other restrictions upon voting
rights. 48 The Court's intense concern for the open and democratic
operation of the political system also took shape in decisions
strengthening the constitutional safeguards securing the free flow of
information, criticism and debate,49 voluntary association, 50 demon-
strations and dissent51-protection for far out groups as well as the
conventional. The force of egalitarianism also led the Court to sweep
away other forms of discrimination, most notably those based upon
sex,52 alienage, 53 legitimacy, 54 and length of residence.55 Never had
such thorough-going reform of criminal procedure been accomplished
in so short a time.56
Barrels of ink have been spent in debating the return to an earlier
activism, 57 but simple activism is not the point I wish to emphasize. It
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
47. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
48. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
49. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
50. See note 37 supra.
51. E.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
52. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71(1971).
53. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
54. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968). But cf. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
55. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
56. A. Cox, THE WARREN CouRT ch. 4 (1968).
57. For a collection and discussion of academic commentary see Wright, Professor
Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
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is other characteristics of the new era which gave new dimensions to
constitutional adjudication in the federal courts.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF REFORM
One novel aspect of constitutional adjudication during the past two
decades has been the conversion of an instrument of continuity into a
weapon of reform. A judge who believes in progress and in special
judicial responsibility for values and groups not adequately repre-
sented in the political process will find it natural, if not obligatory, to
require the revision of old laws and settled government practices in-
consistent with what he believes to be national ideals. As a result,
where the older activist decisions merely blocked legislative initiatives,
the decisions of the 1950's and 1960's forced changes in the estab-
lished legal order. The school desegregation cases58 overturned not
only the constitutional precedents built up over three quarters of a
century but the social structure of an entire region. In the first reap-
portionment case59 counsel frankly avowed that the judiciary should
wipe out gross malapportionment because both Congress and the state
legislature had failed to act; at least one Justice acknowledged that to
do what the political branches would not do was his reason for voting
to take jurisdiction. 60 The one man, one vote rule asserted that the
composition of the legislatures of all but one or two of the 50 states
was unconstitutional and had been unconstitutional for fifty or a
hundred years. 61 Many of the decisions improving criminal procedure
-for example, the ruling that a state is constitutionally required to
provide counsel to indigent defendants in criminal cases62-corrected
appalling state deficiencies, but others upset defensible practices sanc-
tioned by decades of constitutional decisions. 63 New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan64 overturned the law of libel as it had prevailed from the
beginning. Bloom v. Illinois65 took away an historic judicial power to
58. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186(1962).
60. Id. at 258-59 (Clark. J.. concurring).
61. Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
62. Douglas v. California. 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
63. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
64. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
65. 391 U.S. 194(1968).
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punish for contempt of court without a trial by jury. One could easily
multiply examples.
President Nixon's four appointees, including Chief Justice Burger,
slowed the pace of change but the new Justices seem not to shrink
from using constitutional law as an instrument of reform when an ex-
isting rule offends their preferences. The decisions in the abortion
cases66 swept aside statutes in at least forty states, supported by recent
votes as well as moral themes dominant in American life for more
than a century. Similar reforming decisions have been rendered by the
supposed "strict constructionists" in the area of "women's rights." 67
This January a unanimous Court overruled a century-old limitation
upon state power to tax goods imported from abroad.6 8 In 1962 Alex-
ander M. Bickel could write, "Continuity is a chief concern of the
Court, as it is the main reason for the Court's place in the hearts of its
countrymen. '69 No one could say that today.
I return later to this new dimension of constitutional adjudication.70
For the moment, it is enough to suggest that in the long run the Na-
tion's acceptance of the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court
as instruments of enforced change without expression of legislative or
popular approval might well be very different from the Nation's re-
sponse to law as an instrument of continuity checking oppressive legis-
lative innovation.
III. PROCEDURAL CHANGES
In the beginning Chief Justice Marshall justified judicial power to
rule an act of the legislative or executive branch unconstitutional as
an inescapable part of the judicial duty to decide ordinary actions at
law and suits in equity in accordance with law. Marshall himself was
not altogether backward in reaching out to decide constitutional ques-
tions. Jefferson was thoroughly justified in complaining that Marshall
violated normal precepts of judicial behavior in Marbury v.
Madison71 by going far out of his way to assert that officers in the
66. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
67. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1971).
68. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
69. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 32 (1962).
70. See text accompanying notes 118-146 and 154-158 infra.
71. 5U.S.(I Cranch) 118 (1803).
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executive branch acting upon the instructions of the President are
amenable to judicial process;72 and the Court could easily have
decided the case without proclaiming that the courts will disregard
congressional legislation which they deem inconsistent with the Con-
stitution. 73 In later years, particularly under the influence of Justice
Brandeis,74 what I describe as the orthodox view gained genuine ac-
ceptance. There had to be a plaintiff who had suffered or was about to
suffer the kind of injury of which courts would take cognizance in non-
constitutional cases. 75 There also had to be a concrete instance of
how the challenged statute had actually operated in a practical situa-
tion.76 The constitutional question would not be determined if there
were any other way of deciding the litigation. 77 Constitutional ques-
tions usually were decided when raised in defense of a criminal prose-
cution,7 8 in actions to recover monetary damages for harm already
done, 9 and in suits against government officials to enjoin them from
carrying out threats to impose immediate sanctions against a specific
plaintiff under an allegedly unconstitutional law under circumstances
in which delay would result in irreparable injury.80
Judges who perceive the function of constitutional adjudication to
be the promotion of values and the interests of groups not adequately
represented in the political process tend to be impatient with restraints
that rest easily upon those who see constitutional adjudication as an
unpleasant and dangerous duty to be performed only when required in
order to resolve issues arising in the exercise of other judicial func-
tions. In this respect the Warren and Burger Courts are markedly dif-
72. I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 244-45
(1926). quoting, letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson. June 12. 1823.
73. G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
13-14 (8th ed. 1970).
74. See, e.g., his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA. 297 U.S. 288. 341-56
(1936).
75. Columbus G. Ry. v. Miller. 283 U.S. 96 (1931); Massachusetts v. Mellon.
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
76. Arizona v. California. 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Gran-
nis. 273 U.S. 70(1926).
77. Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R.. 213 U.S. 175. 191 (1909); Light v. United States.
220 U.S. 523 (1911).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Darby. 312 U.S. 100 (1941): Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
79. See, e.g., Hall v. DeCuir. 95 U.S. 485 (1877); Dred Scott v. Sanford. 60
U.S. (19 How.) 691 (1857).
80. Unless these precise requirements were met, the bill would be dismissed for
want of equity. E.g., Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge. 295 U.S. 89 (1935):
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
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ferent. The Warren Court often seemed impatient to reach any con-
ceivable constitutional question. The present majority has accepted
much of the loosening of old procedural constraints, but it resists fur-
ther liberalization and has cut back in some particulars. No one can
be sure where the balance will be struck, but it is clear that the view
that constitutional adjudication is collateral to the essential judicial
task of deciding lawsuits has yielded ground to the conception that the
primary function of the Supreme Court of the United States, in sup-
port of its special responsibility for liberty and equality, is to insure
that other organs of government observe constitutional limitations.81
A. Declaratory Judgments
One important instrument of judicial expansion is the declaratory
judgment, a procedure much opposed by Justice Brandeis which was
imported into the federal courts in 193782 in order that persons might
determine controverted legal rights and duties growing out of a partic-
ular transaction without awaiting an action for damages, or even for
harm to be done.83 By the 1960's the new procedure had markedly
affected constitutional litigation. No longer need a person wishing to
challenge a statute or administrative practice await action--or at least
an explicit threat of immediate action-against him.84 No longer need
he show that he is entitled to some remedy beyond a declaration upon
the constitutional question.85 Concurrently, the opportunity to use
81. The strongest statement of this conception is in the concurring opinion of
Justice Douglas in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111 (1968):
The judiciary is an indispensable part of the operation of our federal system.
With the growing complexities of government it is often the one and only place
where effective relief can be obtained ...
.l he Constitution even with the judicial gloss it has acquired plainly is not
adequate to protect the individual against the growing bureaucracy in the Legis-
lative and Executive Branches. He faces a formidable opponent in government,
even when when he is endowed with funds and with courage. The individual is
almost certain to be plowed under, unless he has a well-organized active political
group to speak for him. The church is one. The press is another. The union is a
third. But if a powerful sponsor is lacking, individual liberty withers-in spite of
glowing opinions and resounding constitutional phrases.
I would not be niggardly therefore in giving private attorneys general standing
to sue. ...
82. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).,
83. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
84. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964); Dickson, Declaratory Remedies and Constitutional Change, 24 VAND.
L. REV. 257 (1971).
85. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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declaratory judgments in order to resolve policy differences in consti-
tutional litigation was expanded by the relaxation of rules determining
who may seek judicial aid and who may raise constitutional questions.
B. Standing to Sue
The old law gave standing to sue in complaint of acts of govern-
ment officials only if their conduct invaded a recognized legal right
protected against like invasions of private persons. For example, elec-
tric power companies in the southeastern United States were denied
"standing" to challenge the constitutionality of the Tennessee Valley
Authority upon the ground that the law gave no legal protection
against competition. 86 Today, almost any form of actual loss gives
standing to sue the government. In one case it was held that a group
of law students who said that they enjoyed the outdoors in the areas of
Virginia close to Washington, D.C. had standing to complain of a
general railroad rate increase because it would raise the cost of
hauling scrap for recycling, increase the demand for exploitation of
natural resources, including any resources near Washington, and thus
reduce the students' enjoyment of the wilderness. 87
During recent terms a limit has been imposed. The Court reversed
decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
allowing citizens to challenge under Article I, Section 6 the practice of
allowing Senators and Representatives to hold commissions as re-
serves in the armed forces, 88 and to challenge under Article I, Section 9
the failure to publish a full account of expenditures of public money
by the Central Intelligence Agency.8 9
C. Standing to Raise Constitutional Questions
Under the older rules even one who had suffered legal injury which
entitled him to go to court was not allowed to attack a statute upon
the ground that it violated some other person's constitutional rights.90
For example, in an unusually strict decision, the owner of a bar who
86. Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
87. United States v. SCRAP. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). See also Flast v. Cohen. 392
U.S. 83 (1968).
88. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
89. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
90. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman. 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
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had violated a state law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor to
women was denied standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
law upon the ground that any violation of the equal protection clause
inherent in the discrimination against women could not involve his
constitutional rights. 91 Contrast the decision a few years ago resulting
from William Baird's challenge to the Massachusetts statute forbid-
ding the distribution of contraceptives to anyone without a doctor's
prescription and to unmarried persons absolutely.92 Baird had handed
a young woman a can of vaginal foam at the end of a speech at
Boston University explaining methods of contraception. Because he
was prosecuted for the crime, he was properly in court; but the only
persons whose constitutional rights were affected were those denied
access to contraceptives they wished to use.,Baird, being married, had
lawful access to contraceptives. He was also a volunteer seeking to
precipitate a constitutional test because of an ideological interest.
Under the Brandeisian view Baird would have had no standing to
argue that the statute invaded other persons' constitutional rights.
Nonetheless, he was given standing on the ground that he wished to be
an "advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives ....
The very point of Baird's giving away vaginal foam was to challenge
the Massachusetts statute that limited access to contraceptives."9 3
In a somewhat similar vein the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has held that any Congressman has standing to ob-
tain such as to the conduct of hostilities in Viet Nam9 4 or as to the
dismissal of a stubborn special prosecutor seeking access to presiden-
tial tapes.95
D. Unconstitutional on its Face
At one time it appeared to be the settled rule that the courts would
inquire into the constitutionality of legislation only so far as a litigant
claimed that a statute was unconstitutional as applied to him.96 Under
the decisions of the 1960's the rule seemingly became that, when the
91. Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108 (1904).
92. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
93. Id. at 445.
94. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
95. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); McCabe v. Atchi-
son, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914). But cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
97-98 (1940).
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first amendment is invoked, the courts should examine the constitu-
tionality of the statute in every possible application not already ex-
cluded by the state court and, if any imaginable application would be
invalid, they should hold the statute a nullity even though the partic-
ular litigant challenging the statute had suffered no loss of his own
constitutional rights. 97 Later cases cut back the doctrine of over-
breadth in situations involving offenses other than the utterance of
words, but the retrenchment is controversial and its extent is far from
clear.98 Most of the Supreme Court decisions applying the doctrine
grew out of state prosecutions, but it must be remembered that one
suing for a declaratory judgment, upon alleging that he may wish to
engage in conduct to which a statute might conceivably be applied,
may attack an entire statute as unconstitutional on its face. 99
Taken together, these relaxations of procedural rules seem to have
three larger consequences: (1) they encourage the bringing of constitu-
tional cases in pursuit of political and ideological causes; (2) they mul-
tiply the collisions between the courts, on one side, and either a state
or the political branches of the federal government, on the other; (3)
they tend to shift the emphasis of the Court's work away from pre-
venting or redressing particular wrongs to specific individuals and to
direct it towards general supervision of the activities of the other
branches. The Court becomes less of a court in the old fashioned
sense and more of a roving commission charged with deciding
whether other branches of government are observing constitutional
limitations.
E. Class Actions
Other new dimensions are added when the declaratory judgment
and relaxed notions of standing are brought to bear in class actions.
At common law A sued B. If A prevailed, the judgment made A
whole, or it ordered B not to interfere with A-nothing more. Under
Rule 23(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure an organization
seeking to reform an entire government program need only to find two
or three persons willing to lend their names to be used to represent
97. Gooding v. Wilson. 405 U.S. 518 (1972). See also Note. The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
98. Broadrick v. Oklahoma. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
99. See Part II1-A supra.
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everyone the program may affect. Now, the rights of every conceiv-
able member of the class must be adjudicated, and the remedy will
protect all of them, even though they have never heard about the case.
The utility of the class action as a device whereby civil rights organi-
zations, community action and civil liberties groups, and public law
offices furnishing legal assistance to the poor can assert the rights of
individuals who are too weak, too poor or too discouraged to initiate
individual suits should not blind us to the concomitants that funda-
mentally affect the character of constitutional adjudication.
One consequence is to invite wide but detailed judicial oversight
over any entire body of executive or administrative practices: military
intelligence, 100 police administration,10' the management of prisons
and asylums, 10 2 school desegregation, 10 3 school financing, 04 and gov-
ernment employment practices. 105 Two examples deserve narration
because the lower court decisions exemplify the potential of class ac-
tions while the Supreme Court's five to four reversals reflect a new
strain of caution that may arrest its full development.
In Laird v. Tatum'0 6 the named plaintiffs, who were active civil
libertarians, sued on behalf of a class of persons whose desire or will-
ingness to engage in exercising freedom of speech, assembly, or asso-
ciation, or any other political rights secured by the Constitution,
might be "chilled" by the Army's collection of domestic intelligence.
The members of the class could have nothing more in common than
distaste for the Army's methods and a vague fear that somehow, some-
where, sometime they might be affected. How many were in the class
it was impossible to say, and no one could know which Army activi-
100. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
101. See, e.g., COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd
sub non. Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976).
102. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), hearing on
standards ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373
(M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);
Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1320
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Morales v. Turman. 383 F. Supp.
53 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
103. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
104. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson
v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
105. See, e.g., Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.
1974); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Officers for Justice v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 371 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
106. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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ties had, and which did not have, a "chilling" effect, except by specu-
lating about the tendency. The inescapable consequence, if the case
had gone to trial, would have been a pretrial inquiry into the entire
conduct of the Army's domestic intelligence program. Exposing the
program to light might well have had salutory consequences, as did
the congressional hearings before Senator Ervin's Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights; 107 but it would have been an altogether novel
use of the courts. No detail of the program would have been irrelevant
because no one could say that there was not some unknown member
of the class whom it might affect. Next, in order to decide the case,
the district judge would have to decide just which activities were and
were not sufficiently material to the Army's lawful mission to justify
the "chilling effect" upon civil liberties. The court of appeals, which
ordered the case to trial before reversal by the Supreme Court, ac-
knowledged that the role of the judge would be to exercise the same
kind of supervision over Army intelligence as the Secretary of War
would exercise in reviewing the work of his subordinates: 10 8
Apparently in the judgment of the civilian head of the Army not ev-
erything being done in the operation of this intelligence system was
necessary to the performance of the military mission. If the Secretary
of the Army can formulate and implement such judgment based on
facts within his Departmental knowledge, the United States District
Court can hear evidence, ascertain the facts, and decide what, if any,
further restrictions on the complained-of activities are called for to
confine the military to their legitimate sphere of activity and to protect
appellants' allegedly infringed constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court reversed by a five to four vote upon the ground
that the allegations of a "chilling effect" failed to state a ripe contro-
versy.
The decision at the present Term in Rizzo v. Goode'0 9 furnishes
another example of the degree of continuing judicial oversight invited
by the class action combined within relaxed rules of remedy and pro-
cedure. The suit was maintained as a class action on behalf of all citi-
zens of Philadelphia and an included class of black citizens by some
107. Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong.. Ist Sess. (1971).
108. 444 F.2d 947. 958 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
109. 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976).
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32 community organizations and the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference. The defendants were the Mayor, City Managing Direc-
tor, and the Police Commissioner. The aim of the suit was to force a
complete revision of police practices in the City of Philadelphia and
also the establishment of new and detailed procedures for handling
citizens' complaints of police misconduct. Citizens' constitutional
rights were shown to be violated in perhaps as many as 20 incidents in
one year in a city of 3 million inhabitants with a 7,500-man police
force. There was no evidence linking the named defendants with au-
thorization or ratification of the misconduct. Upon these findings the
district court asserted legal power to supervise the functioning of the
Philadelphia Police Department" 0 but, instead of exercising that au-
thority .in full, it directed the named defendants to draft, for the ap-
proval of the court, "a comprehensive program for dealing adequately
with civilian complaints," to be formulated along the following
"guidelines" suggested by the court:"'
(1) Appropriate revision of police manuals and rules of procedure
spelling out in some detail, in simple language, the "do's and don'ts"
of permissible conduct in dealing with civilians (for example, manifes-
tations of racial bias, derogatory remarks, offensive language, etc.;
unnecessary damage to property and other unreasonable conduct in
executing search warrants; limitations on pursuit of persons charged
only with summary offenses; recording and processing civilian com-
plaints, etc.); (2) Revision of procedures for processing complaints
against police, including (a) ready availability of forms for use by ci-
vilians in lodging complaints against police officers; (b) a screening
procedure for eliminating frivolous complaints; (c) prompt and ade-
quate investigation of complaints; (d) adjudication of non-frivolous
complaints by an impartial individual or body, insulated so far as
practicable from chain of command pressures, with a fair opportunity
afforded the complainant to present his complaint, and to the police
officer to present his defense; and (3) prompt notification to the con-
cemed parties, informing them of the outcome.
A fourteen page document implementing the interlocutory order was
then negotiated between plaintiffs and defendants and incorporated
into the final judgment. The court of appeals unanimously af-
firmed.112
110. 357F. Supp. 1289, 1321 (1973).
111. Id.
112. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974).
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in an opinion woven of
two strands. One strand argued that the named defendants were not
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where the defendants played no af-
firmative role in the scattered wrongs done by individual police offi-
cers which were only incidents "fairly typical of [those] afflicting po-
lice departments in major urban areas."'1 3 The second strand invoked
the "special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between fed-
eral equitable power and state administration of its own law."'1 4
The opinion can be read to block federal judicial intervention into
the affairs of a police department unless the senior officials have au-
thorized or ratified a pattern of unconstitutional practices. This would
be the consequence of either strand pressed to its logical extreme. I
am inclined to give more weight to the three dissents and to the opin-
ions of the district court and circuit court of appeals, and so to confine
the Supreme Court's decision to its facts, including a number of viola-
tions much too small to support an inference of higher official indif-
ference to the individual wrongs inflicted by inferior officers. So read,
Rizzo v. Goode reveals the strong potential for the use of constitu-
tional litigation to resolve conflicts between citizens and municipal
officials and to secure continuing judicial supervision of an executive
department.
Second, a class action encourages the court to think in terms of
group rights without regard to the situation of any individual plaintiff;
it conceals diversity of opinion within the group and assumes that
what the named plaintiffs request or the court opines is best is the
wish of the entire class. On one occasion the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit criticized the "abandoned view that Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights are exclusively individual rights," and candidly acknowl-
edged that it was less concerned with the rights of individual children
than it was with remaking the educational system of the South in a
way which it judged would redress previous wrongs to the black
people as a group.1 15 If a court does take note of any divergence of
opinion within the class, either upon its own realization of the likeli-
hood or because several representatives come forward with mutually
exclusive proposals, the traditional structure of a lawsuit is broken
113. 96 S. Ct. at 606, quoting 357 F. Supp. at 1318.
114. 96S. Ct. at 607. quotingStefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117. 120 (1951).
115. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.. 372 F.2d 836. 864-78 (5th
Cir. 1966). cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
812
Vol. 51: 791, 1976
Constitutional Adjudication
and the court is forced to compromise or choose among multi-polar
interests much in the manner of a political organ. The problem is il-
lustrated by the clash between the national NAACP and its Atlanta
branch over the remedy for previous unconstitutional school segrega-
tion. 116
A third consequence of the increased use of class actions in consti-
tutional litigation is to impart a legislative quality to many of the rem-
edies prescribed. The court becomes concerned not with A's demands
upon B but with the formulation of rules to govern hundreds and even
thousands of persons. When the claim is that a man is held in prison
without a fair trial or under a statute which punishes speech protected
by the first amendment, the judgment reverses the conviction or, at
most, requires that the defendant be released. If the suit is brought on
behalf of all persons incarcerated or threatened with incarceration in
the state penitentiary upon the ground that the physical conditions,
crowding, disciplinary rules and methods of punishing infractions
make. confinement in the prison a cruel and unusual punishment vio-
lating the eighth amendment, the court which sustains the claim has
little choice but to prescribe how the prison should be renovated and
how it should be run.117 Again, an action by a single black child and
her parents complaining that she is denied equal protection of the law
by assignment to a school for black students might lead to a decree
requiring her admission to an unsegregated school. If the suit is
brought as a class action on behalf of all the black school children in
the city, the judge. will be forced to order, and perhaps himself to pre-
scribe and administer, a reorganization of the entire school system.
IV. THE IMPOSITION OF AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES
Throughout most of our history the form of the Supreme Court's
contributions to public policy was negative. To note the form is not to
minimize the grandeur of John Marshall's conception of a politically
116. Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1973), remanded, 487 F.2d
680 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975).
117. E.g., Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972),'aff'd, 503
F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Morales v. Turman,
383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974); AFSCME v. Walker, 27 Ill. App. 3d 883, 327
N.E.2d 568 (1975); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), modified sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction,
505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
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and economically unified Nation, the influence of the Court's great
opinions upon the national consciousness, the momentum generated
by important judgments legitimating assertions of state or congres-
sional power, or the obvious fact that eliminating a governmental re-
straint upon private action may release forces that do more to shape
the character of life than any governmental measure. Nearly all our
experience with constitutional adjudication, however, and most
studies of the role of the Court have dealt with judgments which did
little more than validate or veto as unconstitutional action by another
branch of government: by the President, by the President and Con-
gress, by the states and the state legislatures, governors and courts,
and by other minor officials. Decrees telling state officials what pro-
grams they should institute or requiring legislatures to appropriate
vast sums would have been unthinkable. When the Court entered its
validation or veto, the Court was done with the matter.
This proposition is no longer true. Decisions mandating reforms in
the on-going activities of other branches of government reforms often
require affirmative action. The affirmative action can be secured only
through voluntary cooperation of the political branches or else by the
courts themselves embarking upon programs having typically admin-
istrative, executive and even legislative characteristics heretofore
thought to make such programs unsuited to judicial undertaking.
The most prominent examples are the school desegregation cases.
The court determines which students will be assigned to each school,
how teachers shall be selected, what security measures shall be
adopted, and even where new schools shall be built. 118 When trans-
portation is required, the court directs the expenditure of hundreds of
thousands of dollars. 119
The necessary components of any program of integrated education
in a large city appear to commit the courts to constant executive or
administrative supervision of the organization, employment practices,
curriculum, and extracurricular activities of entire school systems. In
Boston, for example, the city was induced by fear of fiscal disaster to
plan the elimination of 191 teachers. The federal court went down the
118. Probably the clearest examples are the orders relating to the Boston public
schools following the decision in Morgan v. Hennigan. 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.
1974).
119. The most dramatic example is the order relating to the Detroit public
schools which was set aside upon other grounds in Milliken v. Bradley. 418 U.S. 717
(1974).
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list, school by school, even hearing the personal pleas of individual
teachers, and decided to allow 60 layoffs and disallow 131.120
Desegregation decrees have all the qualities of social legislation.
They pertain to the future. They are mandatory; they govern millions
of people. They reorder people's lives in a way that benefits some and
disappoints others in order to achieve social objectives. Many parents
whose children were to be bussed into other neighborhoods pursued
the ambition of moving to a "better neighborhood" not alone or even
primarily for their own lives, but for what they saw as a preferable
social life and better education for their children. The decrees di-
recting the state to remove children from this environment not only
frustrate the parents' aspirations but, as the parents often see it,
threaten the emotional well-being and possibly the physical safety of
their children. There must be many parents in the inner cities who
share very similar misgivings about the government's "pushing their
children around" by assigning them to schools in the so-called "better
neighborhoods." The decrees thus directly regulate the lives of mil-
lions of people without voice in the decision.
I can think of no earlier decrees with these characteristics in all
constitutional history. Apart from the unhappy experience with eco-
nomic "due process," constitutional adjudication under both the four-
teenth amendment and the Bill of Rights has been concerned with
stopping wrongs done by a state to a few individuals or a minority-
usually by official aggression but sometimes, recently, by withholding
benefits or other public protection. The decisions prior to the New
Deal invalidating regulation of wages, hours of labor, and prices as
well as laws protecting the formation of labor unions121 did involve
the conflicting interests of large social and economic classes, but even
there the Court was vetoing accommodations worked out through the
political process, not imposing upon millions of people a novel pro-
gram of legislative character without popular representation. Those
decisions were wrong primarily because the Justices in the majority
failed to perceive the changes in American society. One wonders
whether the old Court may not also have been wrong in thinking that
issues involving the accommodation of the direct interests of large
groups of people are fit for judicial resolution. If so, is the modern
Court any less mistaken?
120. The Boston Globe, Mar. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
12 1. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
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In emphasizing these characteristics I do not mean to imply that the
courts should have omitted the undertaking. Quite likely it was the
only way to instill the conviction that the constitutional promise of
equality was genuine and capable of realization. But approval of the
aim and even of the means chosen should not blind us either to the
novel aspects of the judicial venture or to the resulting degree of judi-
cial dependence upon political support. The courts cannot possibly go
it alone. At the very minimum the community's professional educators
must cooperate. Even that will hardly be sufficient if the political
community withholds its support and the people are recalcitrant. The
danger is not inconsiderable because these quasi-legislative decrees
cannot be said, like true legislation, to have the legitimacy which flows
from the processes of democratic self-government.
The reapportionment cases provide a second dramatic example of
judicial involvement in affirmative undertakings of an essentially legis-
lative character as a consequence of constitutional adjudication. In
theory, if an apportionment is shown to violate the "one man, one
vote" rule, a court can content itself with declaring the existing system
invalid and forbidding future elections undl the system is reformed. As
a practical matter, to hold no elections would be intolerable. If the
legislature does not act, the court must take the affirmative step of
preparing a new apportionment. A statistician using a computer could
produce for any state scores of apportionment plans conforming to
the one man, one vote rule. The choice between constitutionally
adequate plans depends upon altogether different questions: (1) How
many 'safe' districts shall be created for the major parties? (2) Should
the bias be towards protecting incumbents or pitting them against
each other? (3) Which party will be favored? (4) Shall an area heavily
populated by a self-conscious racial or ethnic minority be made a
single district, in which case it may elect one truly representative fig-
ure, or shall it be divided, in which case the minority may, under some
circumstances, lose all power but, under other circumstances, exert
decisive influence in two or three districts? (5) Should the district lines
follow existing municipal and county lines? (6) How much use should
be made of multi-member districts? The answers have large political
consequences. Judges can devise the plans, if they have to do it,
calling upon expert assistance, but they do not like the assignment
because a court's public stature depends upon both the appearance
and actuality of freedom from electoral politics, and because there are
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no legal principles to govern the choice among constitutional plans.
The task is utterly unlike any previously thought appropriate for a
court, but it has been performed with apparent success by a number
of state and federal judges. 22
The use of constitutional adjudication to secure reorganization of
state programs through affirmative judicial command is not confined
to judicial remedies for past violations. The due process and equal
protection clauses have gradually become sources of affirmative govern-
ment obligations and not mere restrictions upon government interfer-
ence with private action. Simple examples are in Griffin v. Illinois23
and Douglas v. California,'24 holding that a state must provide an in-
digent person charged with crime a transcript and lawyer for appeal.
Once allegations of denial of equal protection were focused upon the
sanctions a state was imposing upon one group but not another. Today
the charge more often is that the state is failing to provide equal bene-
fits: in welfare, 25 in education, 126 in municipal protection. 27 Where
once one would have regarded the due process clause as a check upon
the government's power to push people around, today the due process
clause may also furnish a constitutioiial basis for judicial reform of
social services.
An example may make my meaning clear. Bryce Hospital is part of
mental health facilities of the State of Alabama. A class suit was
brought in a federal court on behalf of all the patients confined at
Bryce Hospital and some of the employees aimed at compelling a re-
organization and the improvement of the health services on the theory
that the existing conditions violated the patients' constitutional
rights. 128 Judge Frank Johnson, sitting in the federal district court,
122. R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT iN LAW AND
POLITICS 290-328 (1968). See, e.g., Skolnick v. State Electoral Board, 336 F. Supp.
839 (N.D. Iii. 1971).
123. 351 U.S. 12(1956).
124. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
125. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
126. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
127. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
128. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), hearing on standards
ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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ruled that because the patients had been involuntarily committed, they
"'unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual
treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured
or to improve his or her mental condition.' "129 Later, he entered a
long and detailed order for the operation of the physical facilities and
the conduct of the medical program. Only by reading the decree itself
can the observer appreciate the extent to which a federal court or-
dered the expenditure of state funds and entered into the detailed
management of a state institution. In prescribing physical renovation
the decree went into such detail as:130
Thermostatically controlled hot water shall be provided in adequate
quantities and maintained at the required temperature for patient or
residential use (1100 F at the fixture) and for mechanical dishwashing
and laundry use (1800 F at the equipment).
The judge also prescribed the exact numbers of medical and sup-
porting personnel required in each job classification for each 250 pa-
tients.13' Even the doctors were told how to proceed:' 32
26. Each patient shall have an individualized treatment plan. This
plan shall be developed by appropriate Qualified Mental Health Pro-
fessionals, including a psychiatrist, and implemented as soon as pos-
sible-in any event no later than five days after the patient's admis-
sion. Each individualized treatment plan shall contain:
a. a statement of the nature of the specific problems and specific
needs of the patient;
b. a statement of the least restrictive treatment conditions necessary
to achieve the purposes of commitment;
c. a description of intermediate and long-range treatment goals,
with a projected timetable for their attainment;
d. a statement and rationale for the plan of treatment for achieving
these intermediate and long-range goals;
e. a specification of staff responsibility and a description of pro-
posed staff involvement with the patient in order to attain these
treatment goals;
f. criteria for release to less restrictive treatment conditions, and
criteria for discharge.
129. 344 F. Supp. at 374 citing 325 F. Supp. at 784.
130. Id. at 382.
131. Id. at384.
132. Id.
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Another section described in 16 paragraphs the exact records to be
kept for every patient.1 33
The court was not unaware that it was ordering the Alabama legis-
lature to meet in special session and vote large appropriations.134
In the event, though, that the Legislature fails to satisfy its well-
defined constitutional obligation and the Mental Health Board, be-
cause of lack of funding or any other legally insufficient reason, fails
to implement fully the standards herein ordered, it will be necessary
for the Court to take affirmative steps, including appointing a master,
to ensure that proper funding is realized ...
It is important to separate the need for reform at Bryce Hospital
from the implications of using constitutional adjudication to accom-
plish the reform. The conditions at Bryce Hospital were inhuman.
Possibly, the federal judges, acting in the name of the Constitution,
are the only available ombudsmen to check upon the derelictions of
the executive and legislative branches-on the derelictions of the
whole people of a state acting in their corporate capacity. In many
respects the role which the federal courts are thus undertaking is the
modem analog of the earlier judicial task of forbidding governmental
intrusions upon the citizens. As the dependence of the citizen upon
government activities increases, so will grow the proportion of the
cases in which the critical issues of human liberty, equality and dig-
nity-of individual right against the government-will depend upon
how well the government is satisfying its obligations rather upon
whether the government should leave the individual to himself. The
Court will scarcely perform its historical function of protecting the
individual in his relation with the state unless substantive constitution-.
al rights and the processes of constitutional adjudication can be adapted
so as to retain vitality despite the difficulties of the new milieu. The
only point upon which I wish to insist is that the role requires entirely
novel forms of judicial action and subjects judge-made constitutional
law to more severe stresses than traditional determinations. Just as
Judge Arthur Garrity has become the chief executive of the Boston
schools, Judge Johnson also became in effect, the chief executive or
administrator of Bryce Hospital. Both also superseded the political
bodies in appropriating funds and, indirectly, in raising revenue.
133. Id.at385.
134. Id. at 394.
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The Bryce Hospital case does not stand alone. A similar action in
Ohio led to the same kind of judicial prescription.1 35 Federal courts
have undertaken to require not only the rewriting of prison rules and
regulations but the rebuilding of prison facilities.136 In Boston, Federal
Judge Garrity is requiring reconstruction of a local prison as well as
running the public school system.' 37 In Texas, a federal court under-
took to specify the work load of each staff social worker, the level of
training to be possessed by prison psychologists, the classes in mathe-
matics, and languages to be provided inmates, and the social environ-
ment, including "[a] coeducational living environment . . . [allow-
ing] frequent and regular contacts with members of the opposite
sex. .... -138 Although the Supreme Court of the United States dis-
missed a similar suit,' 39 the California1 40 and New Jersey' 41 courts
have held that financing public education out of local property taxes
where school districts vary widely in the value of the taxable property
per pupil is unconstitutional. Perhaps the California and New Jersey
legislatures will adopt new revenue measures, but at the moment the
New Jersey court seems to face the choice of backing down or raising
money by itself.' 42
The ever-increasing volume of constitutional litigation, the pace of
change, the expansion of constitutional law into hitherto untouched
fields, the transformation of lawsuits from narrowly-structured vehi-
cles for redressing individual wrongs into occasions for wide-ranging
judicial supervision of administrative and executive responsibilities,
and the prescription of affirmative duties-all these seem to reflect a
new conception of the function of constitutional adjudication. The
transformation is also evidenced by changes in judicial style. Tradi-
tionally, a court ruled upon the particular case before it and left the
next move to the political branches. Of late, the Supreme Court has
deemed it appropriate to announce detailed guidelines written in the
135. Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
136. Gates v. Collier. 390 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss. 1975). aff'd, 525 F.2d 965
(5th Cir. 1976); Rhem v. Malcolm. 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Hamilton
v. Landrieu. 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972).
137. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt. 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass.
1973).
138. Morales v. Turman. 383 F. Supp. 53, 100-01 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
139. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
140. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241. 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
141. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473. 303 A.2d 273. cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973).
142. Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 333. 339 A.2d 193 (1975).
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form of legislative regulations. In an effort to prevent coerced confes-
sions and protect the poor, the weak and the ignorant when suspected
of crime, the Court promulgated the Miranda rules regulating police
conduct with some specificity. 143 The opinioi acknowledges that the
rules are not in the Constitution but announces an intent to enforce
them through constitutional adjudication until and unless the legisla-
tures provide equally effective protection in another form. 44 At the
1971 Term the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, laid
down an even more detailed set of rules for the government of state
parole boards.145 Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in the
abortion cases prescribes what abortions the state must permit all doc-
tors to perform and what the state may prohibit, in full medical detail
and with exact time limits.' 46 I cannot shake the conviction that the
style and tone of such opinions is still further evidence of major
change in the Court's own conception of its role and not merely in the
technique by which the role is accomplished.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES
In the polemics of constitutional debate the defenders of the Su-
preme Court are expected to assert that the Court is ever faithful to an
inexorable, unchanging fundamental law. It is the critics who charge
the Court with personal or political decisions. "Activist" is often a
word of condemnation. My emphasis upon the changing nature of
constitutional adjudication should not be misunderstood. In my view
all law, including constitutional law, is a human instrument designed
to meet human needs; the only question is how the needs can best be
met as nearly as may be, not only for ourselves but for our children
and their children. Judged by this test-and for the short run-the
changes in constitutional adjudication during the past two decades-
have been extraordinarily fruitful.
But the test I state also implies concern for a long range future-
concern for our children and their children. We may pay too high '
price for some short range results that are good in terms of immediate
substantive public policy if the cost is the destruction-or even the
143. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
144. Id. at 444-45,478-79, 491.
145. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
146. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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impairment-of the long-run usefulness of the Court as an instrument
for achieving other important objectives. If destroyed or impaired, the
instrument will not be available-or if available, will not be as effec-
tive-for doing the good it can do, without consuming itself, in the
longer future. In quite utilitarian terms, therefore, there may be a ten-
sion between short-run, beneficial social and political results and longer-
range institutional considerations-between today's good and tomor-
row's. It is wrong to assume the antithesis, but equally wrong not to
examine the potential.
The liberalization of procedural constraints, coupled with the wi-
dening circle of personal and political rights secured by active review,
the expansion of constitutional law into hitherto untouched fields, the
transformation of lawsuits from narrowly-structured vehicles for re-
dressing individual wrongs into occasions for wide-ranging judicial
supervision of administrative and executive responsibilities-all these
changes multiply the occasions for collision between the courts and
the political branches. Every collision creates strain and carries risk.
Furthermore, when a constitutional mandate requires affirmative ac-
tion, i.e. the revision, or adoption and implementation, of some on-
going governmental program, the Court must either rely upon the
good will of the legislature or else itself take over essentially legislative
functions. To induce the political branches to adopt and implement an
on-going, affirmative program conforming to a constitutional decision
puts judicial power to a much more stringent test than the traditional
order to stop governmental interference with private action. These
difficulties are intensified when judicial decrees take on all the charac-
teristics of social legislation-but without the consent of the people
expressed through elected representatives.
Can the courts continue to fulfill these new functions successfully?
Their success seems to depend upon their competence, i.e., upon
whether the problems will yield to the judicial method, and upon their
"legitimacy," i.e., upon the sense of the political branches, of the rest
of the legal profession, and of enough of the public that what the
courts are doing is "legitimate," and therefore deserves an uncoerced
consent.
A. Of Judicial Competence
That lawyers have always been jacks-of-all trades is hardly a guar-
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anty of competence, but at least it shows that no one should be fright-
ened merely by the newness of the tasks undertaken by federal judges.
Such assignments as reapportioning seats in a state legislature and
bringing about racial integration in a large school system seem hardly
more foreign to the general run of judicial duties than restructuring
businesses under the anti-trust laws or presiding over the operation
and reorganization of the Penn-Central Railroad.
The increasingly administrative and even legislative character of
many of the tasks suggests the need for thorough-going review of the
judicial machinery. The personnel and procedure suited to deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of one accused of smuggling, or the
fault of two colliding vessels, are likely to be ill-adapted to reforming
a prison system.
B. Of Legitimacy
In speaking of the "legitimacy" of constitutional decisions I mean
to include two connotations: (1) adherence to some charter delimiting
however vaguely the proper scope of the judicial function and the
proper manner of performing it; (2) the power to command compli-
ance, and acceptance, which are forms of consent. The two points are
closely interwoven. The Justices' own interpretation of their charter-
their notions of what it is legitimate for them to do--determines what
they will do. The judgment of the rest of the legal profession, of the
political branches, of publicists and other public persons, and ulti-
mately of the people upon whether the judges have stayed within their
charter, determines what the judges can do over a long period, for
that judgment determines what is perceived to be, and therefore is,
"legitimate" in the sense that it has the power to command an un-
coerced consent. For in the long run, the judiciary, having the power
of neither the sword or the purse, must depend upon this kind of
public support in order to survive little wounds as well as major as-
saults from the political branches.
Let me elaborate the last point by two personal examples. In 1963
the Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional for the teachers in
a public school to start the day with prayer or Bible reading. 147 Gov-
ernor Wallace announced that he was instructing the school officials
147. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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in Alabama to disregard the Supreme Court decisions and he chal-
lenged the federal government to stop the violation. Attorney General
Kennedy called me into his office and asked, "Do I have to send fed-
eral marshals into Alabama to stop children from preaching the Bible
in the schools?" I replied, "Of course not." Then he asked, "How is
the Court's decision to be enforced?" I lamely murmured something
to the effect that there was no suit in Alabama; that the problem was
far off in the future; and that, anyway, courts had lots of ways of en-
forcing their decrees. It was a poor answer. What I should have said
was: "Mr. Attorney General, in one sense there is no answer to your
question, just as there is no answer to the question of what would have
happened if President Truman had simply said in 1952, when the
Supreme Court invalidated his seizure of the steel mills: "I do not
intend to comply with the Court's decision." Similarly, there is no
answer to the question, "What would have happened in the summer of
1962 if the railroad workers had persisted by the thousands in going
on strike, regardless of what statute Congress might enact or what
decree a court might enter? The simple fact is that our society is free
because it depends not upon force but upon the rule of law; and the
rule of law depends upon voluntary compliance. The answer to your
question, in another sense, is that the community knows the impor-
tance of the rule of law and when such challenges occur, the people
will insist upon compliance."
Of course, the upshot is rarely certain. In the beginning, President
Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison refused to go to court to
answer Marbury's application for mandamus. If the Supreme Court
had issued an order, directed to Madison, Jefferson and he would
have laughed successfully at John Marshall's pretensions.1 48 President
Lincoln disregarded a judicial of writ of habeas corpus at the start of
the Civil War.149 President Franklin D. Roosevelt was ready to take
the case to the country if the Supreme Court invalidated his financial
measures. 150 Knowing this history and assuming that President Nixon
knew it too, I often lay awake until morning, while I was Watergate
Special Prosecutor, worrying what would happen if President Nixon,
148. The best accounts are I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 169-316 (rev. ed. 1926); 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL
1-222 (1919).
149. 2 C. WARREN. supra note 148, at 369-74.
150. W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE
NEW LEGALITY 1932-1968, at 35 (1970).
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who seemed to have an imperial view of the Presidency, were tempted
to defy the courts. The courts, as I have said, have neither the purse
nor the sword. President Nixon had received an overwhelming pop-
ular endorsement less than a year before. The question of executive
privilege might seem dryly technical. The pebple might think it un-
seemly for judges in lower courts to be issuing orders to the Chief of
State. At the time, there were few signs that the country had turned
against the President. A Harvard professor seemed an unlikely rallying
point. Suppose that President Nixon's defiance were successful. The
habit of compliance-the notion that a powerful executive official has
no choice but to comply with a judicial decree-is a fragile bond.
Who could say in an age of Presidential aggrandizement that, if one
President succeeded in defiance, others might not follow the example
until ours was no longer a government of law? Was it right to reject
compromise and risk setting in motion this train of events? On the
other hand, what good was a tradition of constitutionalism if you dare
not put it to test?
The fears proved fantasies. The people proved their determination
-and their normal and political power-to require the highest offi-
cials to meet their obligations under law. Still, one has to ask-what is
the source of judicial power to command acceptance, compliance, and
even support for decrees which have no basis in popular consent.
More particularly, how are the sources of this judicial power likely to
be affected by the changes in the nature of the Supreme Court's role
which I have been describing-changes which seem to put judicial
power to new and more severe, if sometimes less important, tests?
History is one chief source of legitimacy for the basic idea of consti-
tutional adjudication. Out of necessity the Court decided some consti-
tutional questions, chiefly those arising out of our federalism, over a
period of many years, and its performance proved acceptable. Whether
it is because of "the dull traditional habit of mankind" or for some
other reason, as Bagehot said, "[ol ther things being equal, yesterday's
institutions are by far the best for to-day ... [and] the most easy to
get obeyed, the most likely to retain the reverence which they alone
inherit, and which every other must win." 151 To this may be linked the
general acceptance of the courts as forums for resolving a wide variety
of judicially cognizable cases and controversies-a role to which con-
151. W. BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 8 (1963).
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stitutional adjudication is readily acceptable as an appendage provided
that individuals do not make the mistake of severing the two or of
making the tail so big that it wags the dog. But history and habitual
acceptance for adjudication of private rights will not make a new con-
stitutional role legitimate in the eyes of the legal profession nor a radi-
cally and observably new role legitimate in the eyes of the people. Here
the "dull traditional habit of mankind" may aid those who challenge
the courts.
Judge Learned Hand, in a tribute to Cardozo,152 ascribed the
power of judge-made law to the belief that the major influence in judi-
cial decisions is not fiat but principles which bind the judges as well as
the litigants and which apply consistently among all men today, and
also yesterday and tomorrow.153
His authority and his immunity depend upon the assumption that he
speaks with the mouth of others: the momentum of his utterances must
be greater than any which his personal reputation and character can
command, if it is to do the work assigned to it-if it is to stand against
the passionate resentments arising out of the interests he must frus-
trate. . . . Yet the customary law of English-speaking people stands,
a structure indubitably made by the hands of generations of judges
... A judge must manage to escape both horns of this dilemma: he
must preserve his authority by cloaking himself in the majesty of an
overshadowing past; but he must discover some composition with the
dominant needs of his time . ...
The tension is surely greater in constitutional adjudication than in
applying the common law, not only because of the size and impor-
tance of the issues but because here judicial intervention takes the
power to decide an issue away from other branches of government
and puts it beyond the control of the people.
How are the new departures in constitutional adjudication likely to
affect traditional notions of law as sources of legitimacy? No other
Anglo-American court has ever overturned so many precedents and
made so much new law in so short a time as the Supreme Court
during the past two decades. In doing so, the Court often held laws
unconstitutional and overturned social and political institutions which
had stood for many years. Judicial reform also means a greater
152. L. Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1939).
153. id.
826
Vol. 51: 791, 1976
Constitutional Adjudication
number of decisions resting, in fact and also in appearance, more
upon the Justices' view of what represents wise public policy than
upon principles derived from accepted sources of law. A nay-saying
court engaged in invalidating novel legislation upon constitutional
grounds seldom need overrule previous decisions. A reforming court is
constantly overturning precedent and thus belying the belief that
judges are not unrestrainedly asserting their individual or collective
wills but applying an existing body of "law" to which they owe alle-
giance. Consider the abortion cases. The Supreme Court of the United
States has held that the due process clause gives a constitutional right
during the first three months of pregnancy. 54 The Supreme Court of
West Germany, interpreting equally vague language, has held that the
embryo or fetus has a constitutional right to continued existence.' 55
When two courts of last resort reach diametrically opposed conclu-
sions upon whether the decision to terminate a pregnancy exercises or
violates a fundamental human right, will the layman accept either
ruling as a "law" binding upon the judges rather than a fiat dictated
by their personal preferences upon a debatable question?
Still, the prestige of the Supreme Court is surely greater today than
that of other branches of government, and I am inclined to think that
it has never been higher. Is one to explain this reaction by some pecu-
liarity in the present era? Has the legal profession exaggerated the
importance of judicial adherence to a rule of law? Are there other,
stronger sources of legitimacy? Or has society been living on the
momentum of a legitimacy won by earlier adherence to a system of
law which is bound to decline if un-elected judges continue to take
over functions once thought to be suitable only to the political
branches?
The strains are indubitable. The courts cannot always go it alone in
their new kinds of undertakings. Judge Johnson's decrees concerning
Bryce Hospital may have done more harm than good. Alabama did
little more than release 3,000 of the 6,000 patients in order to con-
form to his orders. Salaries remained so low that the required hospital
staff could not be recruited. 56 In New York State, when a federal
154. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
155. Decision of the West German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsge-
richt) of February 25, 1975, BVerfGE 39, 1. For a translation and discussion of this
case see Gorby & Jonas, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v.
Wade, 9 J. MARSH. J. PRAC. P. 551 (1976).
156. Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering In-
stitutional Change, 84 YALE LJ. 1338, 1352-60 (1975).
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judge ruled that an enormous mental nealth hospital fell short of con-
stitutional standards, the state complied with the decree by transfer-
ring to the hospital all the funds appropriated for the prevention and
relief of alcoholism. 157 In Chicago, upon finding in 1969 that the
housing authority and city officials had followed racist policies in lo-
cating new public housing, the federal court issued specific orders with
respect to future projects.' 5 8 Since then, no public housing has been
built in Chicago. In Boston, the judicial effort to integrate the pre-
viously segregated schools has produced two years of violence, hatred
and frustration-and little education. Are such failures proof of judi-
cial over-reaching? Or is the lesson that progress is seldom without
difficulty, disappointment, and even some active resistance, which
must be suffered in the faith that time will bring forth wisdom and re-
straint?
I leave all these questions unanswered, partly because I do not
know the whole answer, partly because they seem to be ruled by anti-
nomies, and partly in order to raise another point not unrelated to the
first.
Professor James Bradley Thayer would have objected to enlarging
the role of constitutional law even if the Court has power to sustain
it. 159
[I] t should be remembered that the exercise of [the power of judicial
review], even when unavoidable, is always attended with a serious
evil, namely that the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the
outside, and the people thus lost the political experience, and the
moral education and stimulus that comes from fighting the question
out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors.
The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function
• . . is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its
sense of moral responsibility.
Was Thayer right? Or does the Court at its best assist in the process
of education? Partly right and partly wrong, I suggest. The great opin-
ions of the Court seem to me to help to make us what we are by
telling us what we may be. The "one man, one vote" cases revived ma-
157. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller. 357 F. Supp.
752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Stone. Overview: The Right to Treatment-Comments on the
Law and Its Impact, 132AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1125 (1975).
158. The protracted litigation is summarized and the latest decision reported in
Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S.Ct. 1538 (1976).
159. J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1974).
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joritarian democracy in the choice of legislators. 160 Brown v. Board of
Education6 1 upset habits so ingrained that their vice could be con-
veniently ignored so long as the Court was silent. Other decisions ex-
panded political liberty and brought more nearly equal justice into the
criminal courts. These changes would have been long delayed-per-
haps they would not have happened-if the country had waited for
legislative action. Still, one cannot accurately say, busing aside, that
the Court forced the decisions upon an unwilling majority or that the
decisions deadened the sense of moral responsibility or dwarfed the
political capacity of the people. The reapportionment cases evoked
widespread popular support. The resistance to the desegregation cases
is still widespread and genuine, but busing aside, there is no doubt
that most of the American people reject apartheid when forced to face
up to the question, and the constitutional decision stirred up a wealth
of supportive political action which has immeasurably improved the
opportunities of former victims of discrimination.
Constitutional adjudication depends upon a delicate, symbiotic rela-
lation. The Court must sometimes be the voice of the spirit, telling us
what we are by reminding us of what we may be. But while the opin-
ions of the Court can help to shape our national understanding of our-
selves, the roots of its decisions must be already in the Nation. The
aspirations voiced by the Court must be those the community is
willing not only to avow but in the end to live by. In the end, I think,
the power of the great constitutional decisions rests upon the accuracy
of the Court's perception of this kind of common will and upon the
Court's resulting ability, by expressing its perception, ultimately to
command not merely a passive but a supportive consensus.
160. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
161. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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